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Using a recently created preemptive strike game (PSG) with 176 participants, we
investigated if the motivations of spite and/or fear promotes aggression that requires a
small cost to the aggressor and imposes a larger cost on the opponent, and confirmed
the earlier finding that fear does but spite does not promote intergroup aggression
when the groups are characterized as minimal groups; additionally, the rate of intergroup
aggression did not vary according to the group membership of the opponent. The PSG
represents a situation in which both the motivations of spite and of fear can logically drive
players to choose an option of aggression against an opponent. Participants decide
whether or not to attack another participant, who also has the same capability. The
decision is made in real time, using a computer. We discuss theoretical implications of
our findings on the evolutionary foundations of intragroup cooperation and intergroup
aggression. The evolutionary model of intergroup aggression, or the parochial altruism
model, posits that intragroup cooperation and intergroup aggression have co-evolved,
and thus it predicts both intragroup cooperation and intergroup aggression to emerge
even in a minimal group devoid of a history of intergroup relationships. The finding that
only intragroup cooperation but not intergroup aggression emerged in the minimal group
experiments strongly suggests that intergroup aggression involves a psychological
mechanism that is independent from that of intragroup cooperation. We further discuss
the implications of these findings on real-world politics and military strategy.
Keywords: preemptive strike, intergroup aggression, outgroup derogation, minimal groups, ingroup favoritism
INTRODUCTION
According to some archeological evidence (Wendorf, 1968), intergroup conflicts, of which the
extreme form is warfare, have been observed in human societies since the late Paleolithic period
(Keeley, 1996; Bowles, 2009; Pinker, 2011). Given the significance of intergroup conflicts and
aggression in human societies, studies in various social science disciplines have sought causal
mechanisms of intergroup conflicts (Waltz, 1959; Schelling, 1980). In social psychology in
particular, intergroup conflicts are considered to be based on the psychological mechanism of
intergroup bias (Brewer, 1979). This social psychology account of intergroup conflicts has recently
been complemented by formal models of evolution (e.g., Choi and Bowles, 2007).
Social psychology research has shown that people have a tendency to cooperate with ingroup
members and aggress against outgroup members; this phenomenon is called the intergroup
Abbreviations: PA model, parochial altruism model; IPD-MD, intergroup prisoner’s dilemma maximizing difference; PSG,
preemptive strike game.
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bias (Hewstone et al., 2002). It has been argued this intergroup
bias is omnipresent and observed even in a social vacuum
called the minimal group situation (Tajfel et al., 1971), which
is devoid of any form of conflict over tangible resources.
Despite the absence of instrumental reasons, a large number of
studies reported that intergroup bias occurs even in minimal
groups (Brewer, 1979; Diehl, 1990). These results have been
replicated across cultures (Yamagishi et al., 2008; Falk et al., 2014).
Furthermore, the same pattern has been observed in students
(Lemyre and Smith, 1985), young children (Fehr et al., 2008), and
non-student samples (Mifune and Yamagishi, 2015).
The universal nature of intergroup bias observed in social
psychology experiments has provided, at least partly, an
impetus for evolutionary minded theorists to build mathematical
models of the evolution of intergroup bias, including both
intragroup cooperation and intergroup aggression. The evolution
of cooperation with individuals beyond kin or partners in
reciprocal relationships is hard to explain with the traditional kin-
selection model or the reciprocal model of altruism (Hamilton,
1964; Trivers, 1971), and yet, it is frequently observed in humans
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Thus, large-scale cooperation with
strangers is one of the biggest puzzles in human evolution
(Pennisi, 2005). Currently, this puzzle has been addressed
in two theoretical lines. The first theoretical approach seeks
the evolutionary foundation of cooperation beyond kin and
reciprocal relationships in the personal benefits the cooperators
themselves obtain through establishment of reputation and
resulting positive behavior from other individuals in general
(Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2006). The
general exchange model of intergroup bias by Yamagishi et al.
(1999), Yamagishi and Mifune (2008), and Mifune et al. (2010)
in social psychology is based on this indirect reciprocity model of
the evolution of cooperation.
The second theoretical approach in evolutionary modeling
does not attribute the evolution of cooperation beyond kin and
reciprocal relationships to its resultant personal gains. Rather,
it explains the evolution of large-scale cooperation in terms of
the group-level rather than individual-level fitness maximization.
The model that provides an evolutionary foundation to the
psychological interpretation of the intergroup bias is a form of the
group-selection model called the parochial altruism (PA) model
of the co-evolution of intragroup cooperation and intergroup
aggression. According to Price’s equation (Price, 1970, 1972), it
is argued that costly cooperation toward ingroup members could
evolve if the intergroup variability in fitness (group-level selection
pressure) is larger than the intragroup variability (individual-level
selection pressure). Although this is not the case for almost all
other organisms, some theorists argue that group-level selection
pressures could exceed individual-level ones, especially in the
case of humans (Wilson and Sober, 1994; Sober and Wilson,
1998; Gintis, 2000; Boyd et al., 2003; Henrich, 2004). The within-
group variance would be reduced through the evolution of
conformity (Henrich and Boyd, 1998; McElreath et al., 2003).
Furthermore, intergroup aggression (e.g., warfare) enhances the
fitness variability between groups (Henrich, 2004). The PA
model further adds the logic of the co-evolution of intragroup
cooperation and intergroup aggression, such that the fitness
advantage of intragroup cooperation is enhanced by the presence
of intergroup aggression (Choi and Bowles, 2007). A simulation
study of the PA model lends support to the argument that
cooperation toward ingroup members could only evolve when
aggression toward outgroup members is present (Choi and
Bowles, 2007). A psychological implication of this model is that
humans have a built-in inclination toward cooperation with
ingroup members together with aggression directed to outgroup
members. Furthermore, this inclination is argued to be triggered
by cues of intergroup relations, no matter if the cues involve
actually existing groups (Bernhard et al., 2006; Reimers and
Diekhof, 2015) or in nominal and arbitrarily created groups
(Abbink et al., 2012; Baumgartner et al., 2012). This logic leads
us to the prediction of outgroup-directed aggression, even in
minimal groups.
A psychological implication of the above PA model account
of intergroup bias, particularly intergroup aggression, is that it is
based on the motivation of spite toward outgroup members. That
is, intergroup aggression is a means by which to maximize the
relative fitness difference between groups. The group-selection
model of evolution argues that outgroup-directed aggression
can evolve when it increases the relative gains of the ingroup
compared to the outgroup, and the PA model adds that
intergroup aggression enhances the fitness advantage of ingroup
cooperation, and thus resulted in intergroup aggression and
ingroup cooperation evolving hand-in-hand. Spiteful preference
or competitive social value orientation (Messick and McClintock,
1968; Van Lange et al., 1997) toward the outgroup is
considered a psychological means to make individuals engage
in this evolutionary adaptive behavior. Despite this theoretical
prediction, the evidence against it is mounting as shown in a
meta-analysis conducted by Balliet et al. (2014). For example,
studies using the allocation of a non-monetary negative resource
(e.g., unpleasant noise), revealed that intergroup bias rarely
occurred in minimal groups; this standard finding is often
called the positive-negative asymmetry effect (Mummendey and
Otten, 1998; Buhl, 1999). Another example comes from the
intergroup prisoner’s dilemma-maximizing difference (IPD-MD)
game (Halevy et al., 2008). In the IPD-MD game participants
are able to choose between maximizing their own gains,
improving ingroup benefits (i.e., ingroup cooperation only), and
improving ingroup benefits while reducing outgroup benefits
at the same time (i.e., both ingroup cooperation and outgroup
aggression). Although some studies show that the third choice
of ingroup cooperation and outgroup aggression is promoted
under cognitive load (De Dreu et al., 2015) or in a non-retaliation
situation (Cacault et al., 2015), the majority of studies using
IPD-MD indicate that the overwhelming majority of participants
choose the option of pure ingroup cooperation while rarely
choosing the option of simultaneous ingroup cooperation and
outgroup aggression (Halevy et al., 2008, 2012; De Dreu, 2010;
De Dreu et al., 2010). Thus, at least up to now, spite-based
outgroup aggression is rarely observed in laboratory experiments
(Yamagishi and Mifune, 2016).
Despite the paucity of evidence of unchallenged, non-
instrumental, spite-based intergroup aggression predicted by the
PA model, intergroup conflicts are ubiquitous in our social life.
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This contrast between experimental evidence and real world
conflicts suggests that the intergroup conflicts plaguing our
social world are not based on the evolutionary-based human
psychology predicted by the PA model. Rather, they are more
likely consequences of real intergroup conflicts over tangible
resources, moral righteousness, or a history of continuous
fighting between groups. The absence of spite-based intergroup
aggression in minimal groups in which either conflict over
tangible resources, moral differences, or history of fighting
is absent, strongly suggests that humans are not likely to
be endowed with an evolutionary-based inclination toward
intergroup aggression per se. It is likely that humans who
continuously spend their social life in groups that are often
in conflict with other groups have developed a fear-induced
belief that they need to defend themselves from potential
aggression from other groups, and this belief often prompts
group members to engage in aggression toward potential
aggressors in self-defense. In fact, Simunovic et al. (2013)
compared the frequency of spite-based aggression and fear-based
aggression and demonstrated that the overwhelming majority of
aggressive incidents in the minimal group situation were fear-
based rather than spite-based. Furthermore, research on the
interindividual-intergroup discontinuity has shown that people
have a naïve belief that groups are more competitive than
individuals (Pemberton et al., 1996), and hence exhibit defensive
non-cooperation in intergroup rather than inter-individual
interactions in the prisoner’s dilemma situation (Wildschut et al.,
2003; Wildschut and Insko, 2007). Although most people in
modern times, living in democratic societies, do not actively
or spitefully attack outgroup members (Yamagishi and Mifune,
2016), it is possible that they experience fear toward outgroups
because of the intensity of historical intergroup conflicts. In
this study, we focused on fear-based intergroup aggression
and investigated if experimental participants exhibit aggression
toward members of a minimal outgroup compared to a minimal
ingroup.
For the purpose of studying fear-based aggression, we used
the PSG developed by Simunovic et al. (2013). In the PSG,
participants are paired with another participant, and each is given
an initial monetary endowment (e.g., JPY 1,500 in Simunovic
et al., 2013). Each participant then decides whether or not to
push a button on a PC screen within a certain timeframe (e.g.,
60 s) without any feedback about the other participant’s behavior.
Both participants receive the initial endowment as is if they both
restrain from pushing the button for the time duration. When
one or both of the participants pushes the button during the time
duration, the one who pushes the button (or, the one who does
so first, if both participants push the button) inflicts a large cost
on the other participant (e.g., JPY 1,000) by paying a smaller
cost (e.g., JPY 100). These costs are subtracted from the initial
endowment. Furthermore, pushing the button first preempts
the other participant from retaliating. That is, the participant
who faces an opponent who has pushed the button faster is
deprived of the capability of successfully pushing the button. The
participant who pushed the button faster nullifies the actions of
their opponent—the second participant suffers a larger cost, and
furthermore, cannot inflict the same larger cost upon the first.
That is, the first attack eliminates the attacked party’s capability
to retaliate. In this PSG, participants motivated by spite should
attack their opponent because the relative payoff of a successful
attack (i.e., the difference between 1,400 yen and 500 yen) is
larger than that of mutual non-attack (1,500 yen, 1,500 yen). Fear
also operates as a motivation to attack in this game. Participants
who expect an attack from their opponent would try to push the
button before it is too late to defend themselves from a potential
attack from their opponent.
While logically either spite or fear motivate the participants’
attack (button pushing) in the PSG, Simunovic et al.’s (2013)
findings indicate that fear is the dominant motivation for
attack. They compared the standard PSG (explained above)
with a unilateral condition of the game in which only one
participant was allowed to push the button. In the unilateral
condition, participants’ expectation of being attacked (i.e., fear)
was removed from the experimental condition, leaving only spite
as the motivation for attack. Results showed that almost half
of the participants pushed the button in the standard condition
while only one participant (out of 26) pushed the button in
the unilateral condition. Furthermore, Simunovic et al. (2013)
used the standard version of the game to compare the attack
rate toward an ingroup member and an outgroup member with
minimal groups. Results showed that the attack rate toward
outgroup members (32%) did not significantly differ from that
of ingroup members (29%).
While Simunovic et al. (2013) findings are impressive, theirs
is the only study that utilized the PSG to study fear-based
aggression as compared to spite-based aggression, and thus the
robustness of the findings have not been fully established. The
primary objective of this study is to demonstrate that the pattern
found by Simunovic et al. (2013) can be replicated with a
different set of parameters. For this purpose, we used different
values for endowment (JPY 1,000 instead of 1,500) and damage
imposed on the attacked party (JPY 500 instead of 1,000). This
parameter change may weaken fear, and therefore the attack
rate may decrease. It cannot be predicted, however, whether
lowered fear causes an overall decrease in attack rate, a decrease
in attack rate specific to the outgroup partner, or both. If we
succeed in replicating the findings—(a) practical non-existence
of spite-based aggression, (b) substantial fear-based aggression,
and (c) the absence of differences in the attack rate toward
the outgroup and the ingroup—with this set of parameters,
we will be better assured that the finding is not limited to
situations where fear of attack is particularly strong. With this
assurance, we will finally speculate on the possible implications
of the findings for intergroup conflict in general and for the co-
evolution of intragroup cooperation and intergroup aggression in
particular.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
This study was reviewed and approved by the ethical committee
at Hokkaido University Center for Experimental Research in
Social Sciences; in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki,
all participants provided written informed consent.
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Participants and Procedure
We first conducted a power analysis and found that 160
participants would be sufficient to correctly detect a substantial
ingroup–outgroup difference in the attack rate of 20 percentage
point at α = 0.05 with power above 0.8. Actually, 176
undergraduate students (100 males and 76 females) at Hokkaido
University in Japan were randomly recruited from a large
participant pool; women constituted 42% of participants in the
outgroup-partner and 44% in the ingroup-partner condition
(χ2(1) = 0.09, p = 0.761]. Cash rewards were emphasized as
incentives for their participation. Monetary incentives were used
to recruit the participants, while no course credit was offered.
Four to eight participants took part in a session. Upon
arrival at the laboratory complex, they were provided with an
ID number and led into isolated compartments one at a time
and sat in front of a computer. Their only contact during the
experiment was with an experimental assistant, who did not
know the participants’ identification numbers and thus would
not be able to match any of the participants to their behavior
in the game. By assuring their anonymity this way, we sought to
diminish participants’ responses based on demand characteristics
and/or self-presentation, which are known to promote aggressive
behavior in laboratory experiments (Tedeschi and Quigley, 1996;
Ritter and Eslea, 2005).
The first task participants performed in the experiment was
a “picture preference test.” Twenty-eight pairs of paintings,
one by Wassily Kandinsky, and the other by Paul Klee, were
consecutively displayed on the participants’ computer screens.
The participants then decided, on each pair, which painting
they liked more. They were then allotted into either the Klee
or the Kandinsky group. We asked the participants about
their attitudes toward ingroup and outgroup members, using
a minimal group identity scale (adapted to the minimal group
situation by Yamagishi and Mifune, 2008, based on Grieve and
Hogg, 1999), consisting of items such as: “How much do you
like Klee- (or Kandinsky-) group members?” “In terms of your
general beliefs and attitudes, how similar do you feel you are to
other Klee- (or Kandinsky-) group members in general?”
Preemptive Strike Game
Once all the participants had been assigned group memberships,
they were given instructions for the PSG. The instructions were
framed in terms of dyadic decision-making concerning monetary
outcomes, without reference to meaning-laden words such as
“defense,” “opponent,” or “attack.”
In the instructions, it was explained that all participants had
been given JPY 1,000 (∼USD 9 at the time of the experiment)
by the experimenter. They would then be paired with another
participant in another compartment, and would decide whether
to push a button on their computer screens or not. They had
a 30 s period during which they could enact their decisions.
If both participants refrained from pushing the button, each
participant would receive the initial endowment of JPY 1,000.
The participant who pushed the button first paid JPY 100, while
the other participant, regardless of whether they themselves
pushed the button or not, incurred a cost of JPY 500 (half of the
endowment size). It was made clear to the participants that only
the action of the one who pushed the button would count.
To examine if participants had a preference for either an
ingroup member or an outgroup member for playing the PSG
with, we asked 141 of the 176 participants, before they were
matched with a partner, if they would prefer an ingroup member
or an outgroup member as their game partner, or if they had
no preference at all. We manipulated group membership as a
between-participants factor. Once all the participants in a session
finished reading the instructions, they were matched with either
an ingroup member or an outgroup member, and played one
round of the computer-mediated PSG with the matched partner.
The assignment of the partner’s group membership was made
randomly even when participants were asked about their partner
preference. The participants understood that the real assignment
would be made randomly rather than based on their partner
preference. Each participant could push the button during the
first 10 s regardless of whether the partner had pushed the
button or not, although the button push did not have any effect
when the partner had already pushed the button. This design
feature allowed us to examine the participants’ willingness to
attack, independently of how fast they could move. According
to Simunovic et al. (2013), almost all participants who pushed
the button did so within the first second of the game, and thus
we could capture the intentions of the relatively slow responders
to attack with this design. We measured reaction time to the
third decimal place to compare matched participants’ attack
effectiveness. Feedback about the outcome of the game was given
to the participants either at the end of the 30 s (for mutual non-
attack), at the end of the 10 s period (in case of unilateral attack),
or immediately after the slower participant’s button pushing (in
case of mutual attack). They were informed about the outcome of
the game over the computer screen. After the game, participants
provided answers to a post-experimental questionnaire, received
their payments, and were led out of the laboratory one at a time.
RESULTS
All raw data used in the analysis is in Supplementary Material.
Group Identity
We calculated the relative identity score defined by the mean
identity score toward the ingroup minus that of the outgroup.
The mean relative identity score was 0.31 (SD = 1.03), which
was significantly greater than zero [t(175) = 4.04, p < 0.0001,
Cohen’s d = 0.25]. There were no main or interaction effects
involving gender (ps > 0.15). This result shows that the minimal
group manipulation (i.e., identification with the ingroup) was
successful.
Attack Rate
The total percentage of attack (button pushing) was 19.3% (95%
CI [13.4, 25.2]). This attack rate did not vary between group
memberships: as in the previous study, there was no difference
in the attack rate when the participants were paired with an
ingroup (N = 88, 19.3%) or an outgroup member [N = 88,
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FIGURE 1 | The attack rate toward ingroup and outgroup members.
19.3%, χ2(1) = 0, p = 1, Cramer’s V = 0]. The use of categorical
independent variables and the lack of correlation between the
two independent variables (partner group and gender) meant
the data met the assumptions of logistic regression analysis (no
multicollinearity, a linear relationship between independent and
dependent odds ratio) in addition to the assumptions of a large
and independent sample. We performed a logistic regression
analysis of attack by the partner group and gender of the
participant. The main effect of gender was significant (Wald
χ2 = 4.60, p = 0.032, adjusted R2 = 0.18). Men (30%) were
more likely to attack than women (5.26%). The main effect of
the partner group or the interaction effect was not significant
(ps> 0.26) (see Figure 1).
Partner Preference
More than two–thirds (70.63%) of the participants who
responded to the partner preference question (N = 143) stated
that they did not care about the group membership of the
partner. About a quarter (23.78%) preferred to play with an
ingroup member and only eight (5.59%) preferred to play
with an outgroup member. Because the number of participants
who preferred an outgroup member was small, making the
use of logistic regression with interactions problematic, we
combined the no-preference and outgroup-preference to form a
combined not-ingroup preference category. No gender difference
was found in partner preference [χ2(1, N = 143) = 0.055,
p = 0.815]. In the logistic regression analysis of attack using
partner group, partner preference, gender, and their interactions
as independent variables, none of the interaction effects were
significant (p > 0.43). We thus dropped all the interactions from
the logistic regression analysis, and found that only gender was
significant (Wald χ2 = 12.49, p < 0.001); neither the main
effect of partner preference nor partner group was significant
(p> 0.59).
Post-experimental Questions
In a post-experimental questionnaire, we asked participants how
strongly they were concerned, before the game actually started,
about the possibility that the partner would push the button
faster. The mean response to this question on a 7-point scale
was 5.47 (SD = 1.89) among those who pushed the button and
3.72 (SD = 1.61) among those who did not. The difference was
highly significant [t(174) = 5.48, p < 0.0001, Cohen’s d = 1.04].
There were no main or interaction effects of gender (ps > 0.83)
in an ANOVA adding gender and partner-group by gender
interaction as independent variables. Furthermore, a similar
question about how anxious they were about the possibility of
the partner pushing the button faster received similar responses
[Mattack = 4.62, SD = 1.89; Mnon attack = 3.80, SD = 1.62;
t(174) = 2.57, p = 0.011, Cohen’s d = 0.49]. Again, there were
also no main or interaction effects involving gender (ps > 0.28).
These results provide support for the fear-based nature of the
preemptive attack in the PSG. We also asked the participants
how satisfied they would be if both participants refrained from
pushing the button and earned JPY 1,000 each, and how satisfied
they would be if they pushed the button first and earned JPY 900.
The participants’ satisfaction with the latter outcome should be
higher than that of the former if they were motivated by spite. The
result was completely opposite to this PA model-based prediction
(see Table 1). Only 5 of 176 participants who responded to
these questions expressed greater satisfaction with the successful
attack outcome than the mutual restraints outcome, and 157
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TABLE 1 | The number of participants answering the satisfaction question.
Successful attack > Mutual
restraints
Indifferent Successful attack < Mutual
restraints
All data (N = 176) 5 (2.84%) 14 (7.95%) 157 (89.2%)
Male (N = 100) 5 (5%) 11 (11%) 84 (84%)
Female (N = 76) 0 (0%) 3 (3.95%) 73 (96.05%)
Attacker (N = 34) 5 (14.71%) 12 (35.29%) 17 (50%)
Male attacker (N = 30) 5 (16.67%) 11 (36.67%) 14 (46.67%)
Female attacker (N = 4) 0 (0%) 1 (25%) 3 (75%)
of 176 expressed greater satisfaction with the latter outcome
compared to the former. The remaining 14 participants expressed
the same level of satisfaction. Half of the participants who pushed
the button (17 of 34) chose that option despite their higher
satisfaction with the mutual restraints outcome. Twelve of those
who pushed the button expressed the same level of satisfaction
with the two outcomes, and only five of them responded
consistently with the PA model prediction, expressing a higher
satisfaction with the successful attack outcome than the mutual
constraints outcome and pushing the button. The overall picture
emerging from these post-experimental questionnaire analyses is
that only very few participants (5 of 176; 3 of 88 who played with
the outgroup, and 2 of 88 who played with the ingroup) engaged
in a preemptive strike out of spite, and the majority of them did
so out of fear-based self-defense.
DISCUSSION
The current study largely replicated the results of Simunovic et al.
(2013). First, a significant portion of the participants pushed the
attack button. A noticeable difference from the previous study
is that the overall attack rate (i.e., 19%, 95% CI [13.4, 25.2]) in
the current study was smaller than that of the previous study
[50% in Study 1, χ2(1) = 13.96, p < 0.001, and 30% in Study
2, χ2(1) = 4.97, p < 0.05 (Simunovic et al., 2013), both of
which significantly differ from the current attack ratio of 19%
in the current study]. This difference may reflect the fact that
the cost of being attacked and thus the motivation of defensive
aggression were smaller in the current study (JPY 500, or half
of the endowment in the current study versus JPY 1,000 or two-
thirds of the endowment in the previous study). This difference
suggests that the greater the suffering from an attack from the
opponent the more willing one is to defend their self-interest
by preemptively eliminating the potential of an attack from the
opponent (cf., Mifune et al., 2016). This possibility is worthy
of further investigation in another study in which the damage
caused by an attack from the opponent is manipulated in a single
experiment.
Simunovic et al. (2013) did not report a gender difference in
the attack rate because they did not find one [Study 1, M = 63.2%
and F = 30.8%, χ2(1, N = 32) = 3.24, p = 0.076; Study 2,
M = 31.8% and F = 28.8%. χ2(1, N = 132) = 0.14, p = 0.705].
Knowing this, we did not expect any gender difference in this
study. Thus, the big gender difference we found in this study
was a surprise. Despite the strong main effect, however, none
of the interaction effects involving gender were significant, and
thus our conclusions need not be altered depending on the
participant’s gender. Below we offer some post hoc speculations
on how gender made a difference in this study, but not in
the previous study (Simunovic et al., 2013). Participants were
recruited from the same participant pool on the promise of
monetary compensation. The gender constitution was about the
same in both studies [43.2% female in the current study and 50%
in the previous study; χ2 (1, N = 308) = 1.41, p = 0.235]. These
sample compositions therefore provide no explanations for the
difference. The major difference between the two studies is in
the cost of being preemptively attacked; it was much smaller in
this study than in the previous study. The resulting smaller fear
of preemptive attack in this study is thus the primary candidate
for the gender difference in this study that did not exist in the
previous study. It is possible that women are more sensitive to
fear of exploitation (Simpson and Van Vugt, 2009) and to the
moral principle of no harm (Graham et al., 2011) than men, and
the defensive attack was a result of the balance between the two.
The smaller cost of exploitation in the current study might have
meant less motivation for defensive aggression and a stronger
moral principle against harm for trivial reasons especially for
women who are more sensitive to them than men, resulting in
weaker fear-based defensive aggression than men. An alternative
explanation could be men’s overconfidence. Johnson et al. (2006)
found that overconfidence in one’s own relative standing was a
significant contributor to attack rate in an experimental wargame.
Furthermore, this trend was more pronounced in males than
in females, who mostly evaluated themselves as average. In our
game, this could have meant male participants felt they would
push the button more quickly than any opponent, while female
participants did not. No matter if any of these possibilities are
right or wrong, gender differences in defensive aggression is
an important topic, given the general importance of gender
differences and a small but persistent tendency for males to
exhibit more aggression across situations (Eagly and Steffen,
1986; Eagly and Wood, 1991; Baron and Richardson, 1994). This
gender difference is also known to be stronger in the group
context (Goodall, 1986; Chagnon, 1988; De Waal, 2005), and the
male warrior hypothesis (Van Vugt et al., 2007; Van Vugt, 2009)
may play some role in this endeavor, although the motivation of
spite that is the central force in the male warrior hypothesis does
not seem to play a big role in the PSG.
Despite this puzzling gender difference, we succeeded in
replicating the previous finding of no intergroup bias in defensive
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aggression. The attack rate toward outgroup members was
not significantly different from that toward ingroup members.
With this in mind, let us speculate on their implications
for the evolution of intra-group cooperation and inter-group
aggression. First, intra-group cooperation is omnipresent both in
the laboratory and the real world. It occurs even in the minimal
group situation. This suggests that the human inclination to
cooperate with ingroup members is deeply rooted, and is
effectively activated with a relatively minor cue of groupness.
On the other hand, intergroup aggression is hardly observed in
laboratory experiments, especially when nominal, rather than real
groups are involved, despite the fact that it is often observed
in social life sometimes with serious consequences. In other
words, inter-group aggression is not likely internally activated by
cue-driven psychological mechanisms. Rather, it requires socially
and historically embedded groups in which a history of past
atrocities is shared by group members. These implications cast
a serious doubt on the validity of the PA model of intra-group
cooperation and inter-group aggression. Given the differences
between intra-group cooperation and inter-group aggression, it
is more natural to think that the two involve rather mutually
independent psychological mechanisms; intra-group cooperation
involving evolved neuropsychological mechanisms, while inter-
group aggression involving beliefs about the history of intergroup
relations and the expectations of the behavior of the outgroup.
This conclusion, however, does not exclude the possibility that
such belief formation is facilitated by the evolutionary-based
group psychology.
Before closing, we would like to discuss limitations of our
study. The participants of our study are semi-WEIRD; although
not Western, they are members of an educated, industrialized,
rich, and democratic society in which norms against the use of
aggression prevail. Another study using a design that reduces the
participants’ concerns with the use of aggression would definitely
help broaden the scope of the conclusions. Another possible
limitation is the lack of face-to-face communication among the
same-group participants, because group members often conspire
to make group-based decisions such as preemptive strikes (cf.,
Mifune et al., 2016). Aggression may be against norms when
performed by an individual, but it can be condoned or even
praised as the norm when it is agreed upon by group members.
Combining face-to-face communication with the presence of a
decision-making leader who can mobilize the members’ fear to
justify an otherwise unjustifiable preemptive strike would be an
exciting topic for future study.
Traditionally, studies of inter-group aggression in social
psychology have been dominated by designs that force intra-
group cooperation and inter-group aggression together, as
inseparable sides of the same coin. For example, it was impossible
for the resources provided to the ingroup to vary independently
of the resources provided to the outgroup in the resource
allocation paradigm originating in the seminal work by Tajfel
et al. (1971). In studies such as the intra- and inter-group
PSG, in which this design constraint was removed, participants
often cooperated with an ingroup member at higher levels
than with an outgroup member or a partner whose group
membership was not known. However, the cooperation level with
an outgroup member was never found to be below the level
they cooperated with an unknown group member (Yamagishi
and Mifune, 2016). Furthermore, participants in most IPD-MD
studies chose the option that provided resources to the ingroup
at a cost to themselves but rarely chose another option that
reduced resources of the outgroup while providing resources to
the ingroup. Given the findings of the current and the previous
studies indicating independence of inter-group aggression and
intra-group cooperation, future studies will benefit by shifting
their focus from the motivation of spite to the motivation of
fear. The lack of inter-group bias in fear in the minimal group
situation that was confirmed in this study provides a benchmark
for examining the effects of other factors in producing fear of
aggression from other groups. The comparison of the attack
rates in the current study and in Simunovic et al.’s (2013)
study suggests one such factor, that is, the seriousness of the
damage caused by the opponent’s aggression. Another interesting
and potentially important topic for future study concerns
the possibility that unilateral disarmament reduces fear-based
aggression from the partner, as shown in the almost complete lack
of aggression in the unilateral aggression condition. This issue is
at the core of the current public dispute in Japan on the abolition
of Article 9 of her constitution that prohibits Japan’s capability to
use military power as a means of international conflict resolution.
Supporters of Article 9 share the belief that it will promote peace;
while those who want to abolish it believe that it will more likely
promote war because it enhances the temptation for potential
enemies to intimidate Japan. If used in a proper manner, the
PSG will provide useful tools to provide scientific answers to this
issue and similar questions of vital interest to politicians, military
strategists, psychologists, and ordinary citizens.
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